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Many discussions of the United States Court of Federal Claims reason
about it by reference to the "other" federal courts-characterized as either Ar-
ticle III or Article I courts-and by analyzing the degree to which the Court of
Federal Claims is or is not distinctive. In this essay, I offer a different perspec-
tive by putting the question of the Court of Federal Claims into the context of
the broader narrative of the many changes within the federal judicial system
over the past century.
When the first Claims Court was created in the middle of the nineteenth
century, it was an oddity and an invention. Although it dealt with monetary
claims arising from contract disputes, it provided no juries. Instead, it had a
separate cadre of judges. Further, all of the court's cases involved the govern-
ment as a party, and specifically as a defendant. And the court had special
links to Congress, both because it could receive cases by reference and because
implementation of its remedies depended on congressional appropriations of
funds to provide payments.
By the end of the twentieth century, the Court of Federal Claims had
ceased to have such an unusual character-not so much because of the rela-
tively minor changes within that court, but because, during the intervening
years, Congress had invented many other courts and agencies and had also
engrafted variations onto the "regular" federal courts.
What do we learn from weaving together the history of the Court of Fed-
eral Claims with that of the federal adjudicatory system in general? First,
while that court once marked a frontier, in hindsight, it anticipated structural
developments of the twentieth century, both in terms of devolving adjudication
to agencies and in terms of staffing federal adjudication with non-life-tenured
judges. For example, magistrate and bankruptcy judges now serve within Ar-
ticle III courts in numbers in excess of life-tenured district judges.
Second, the legality of these innovations depended on the United States
Supreme Court, which, through constitutional interpretation of Article III,
permitted a range of variations in federal adjudicatory institutions.
Third, at a formal level, the Court of Federal Claims is identified by the
provision of money damages against the government. In practice, however,
both the Court of Federal Claims and other courts and agencies now permit a
broader set of remedies against the United States. Moreover, the Court of
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Federal Claims is not the exclusive venue in which to seek monetary compen-
sation from the federal government.
Fourth, the overlap between the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal
Claims and other federal courts and agencies has prompted some to argue for
the demise of the Court of Federal Claims and others to propose imposing
limitations on where claimants can obtain relief against the government. Both
kinds of proposals are misguided. The former seeks jurisdictional coherence
but ignores the politics that shape the creation of courts. The latter relies on a
formal approach that retreats from the functionalism of twentieth century pro-
cedure to leave litigants with fewer means of gaining relief against the govern-
ment. Just as one reform of the twentieth century was to reread Article III so
as to permit the manufacture of scores of federal judges who lacked Article III
attributes, another reform of the twentieth century was to collapse the distinc-
tions between law and equity and to permit liberal joinder of claims and par-
ties-all to enhance the remedial capacities of courts.
Fifth, and finally, the fact that the Court of Federal Claims is no longer
anomalous is cause for celebration. Its twentieth birthday should be the occa-
sion on which to ask questions-about whether its charter suffices, whether its
authority ought to broaden to encompass more parties and more claims, and
whether other federal courts or agencies should have greater capacity to call
the government to account. Evaluation of the Court of Federal Claims at
twenty ought also to prompt contemplation of the remedial authority of both
non-life-tenured judges and Article III judges to assess whether their powers
suffice to provide the remedies necessary for claimants seeking accountability
by and redress against governments in the twenty-first century.
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I. Questioning the Legitimacy of the Court of Federal Claims
At the celebration of the twentieth anniversary of the Court of Federal
Claims in October of 2002, the focus was on the role played by the court in
the federal system. Although it was a birthday party of sorts, some guests
questioned the very existence of the guest of honor. Professor Steven
Schooner argued that the Court of Federal Claims lacked a distinctive char-
acter and that its caseload could be dispersed without imposing undue bur-
dens on other courts or on litigants.'
Not surprisingly, Loren Smith-former Chief Judge and now a member
of the Court of Federal Claims-disagreed with Professor Schooner's propo-
sal for the court's demise.2 Judge Smith relied on both the symbolic and legal
import of the court as justifications for its existence. His commitment to the
court was shared by J. Sheldon Plager of the United States Court of Appeals
I See Steven L. Schooner, The Future: Scrutinizing the Empirical Case for the Court of
Federal Claims, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 714, 717-18 (2003).
2 See Loren A. Smith, Why a Court of Federal Claims?, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 773, 773
(2003).
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for the Federal Circuit.3 Responsive in another fashion was the presentation
by Professor Gregory Sisk, who proposed that either the Supreme Court, the
Federal Circuit, or Congress revisit the jurisdictional charter to shore up the
court's distinctive character by clarifying that the Court of Federal Claims-
and not the district courts-had sole power to provide monetary relief
against the United States for breach of contract obligations.4
These discussions put the existing Court of Federal Claims in the fore-
front of the analysis and reason about the court by reference to the "other"
federal courts-characterized as either Article III or Article I courts. In this
essay, I offer a different perspective by putting the question of the Court of
Federal Claims into the context of the broader narrative of the many changes
within the federal judicial system over the past century.5
Below, I explain why I disagree with Professor Schooner that the court's
continuing existence ought to depend on its coherence as a unique federal
adjudicatory institution. I also explain why I disagree with Professor Sisk on
the desirability of shoring up the distinctiveness of the Court of Federal
Claims by limiting other courts' capacities to grant monetary relief against
the government. Further, although I join with Judge Smith and Judge Plager
in appreciating the political import of an institution identified as providing
redress against the government, I question the sufficiency of the charters of
this and of other federal adjudicatory institutions to make good on that
promise.6
I do not worry about the loss of the peculiar character of the Court of
Federal Claims. Rather, the fact that the court has ceased to be anomalous
as the lone venue for providing monetary relief against the federal govern-
ment is cause for celebration. The twentieth birthday of the institution
should be the occasion on which to ask about how to expand the ability of
it-and of other federal courts-to provide remedies to those alleging gov-
ernment wrongdoing. At issue is whether to reshape the mandates of the
Court of Federal Claims to facilitate the joinder of parties such as govern-
ment contractors, the bringing of class actions, or the expansion of joinder
rules to enable more claims to come before it.7 Also needed is a review of
the authority of both its judges and those of other federal courts to consider
whether their powers suffice, in the twenty-first century, to provide the reme-
dies necessary for claimants against governments. The current efforts by a
bare majority of the Supreme Court to constrain federal remedial capacities,
3 See J. Sheldon Plager, Abolish the Court of Federal Claims? A Question of Democratic
Principle, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 791, 796 (2003).
4 See Gregory C. Sisk, The Tapestry Unravels: Statutory Waivers of Sovereign Immunity
and Money Claims Against the United States, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 602, 675-706 (2003).
5 See generally Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the
Meaning of Article 111, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924 (2000); Judith Resnik, "Uncle Sam Modernizes
His Justice": Inventing the Federal District Courts of the Twentieth Century for the District of
Columbia and the Nation, 90 GEO. L.J. 607 (2002) [hereinafter Resnik, Inventing the Federal
District Courts].
6 See generally Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress,
and Federal Power, 78 IND. L.J. 223 (2003) [hereinafter Resnik, Constricting Remedies].
7 See generally Marcia G. Madsen & Gregory A. Smith, The Court of Federal Claims in
the 21st Century: Specific Proposals for Legislative Changes, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 824 (2003).
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echoed by proposals here to limit the venues for obtaining remedies against
the government, ought to be rejected in favor of devising methods by which
to make the federal government more accountable to those who challenge its
actions. 8
I1. Inventing Courts
When a court of claims was first born in the nineteenth century, 9 it was a
true oddity and a real invention, responsive to specific needs of those times.
In today's language, we might realize that the Court of Claims was one of our
first agencies. It had aspects that made it court-like, with judges presiding to
consider claims for money damages against the United States government.
But it also lacked some of the trappings associated with other federal
courts. Although it dealt with monetary claims arising under contracts, it
provided no juries. Rather, it had a special and separate cadre of judges.I °
Further, all of the court's cases involved the government as a party, and spe-
cifically as a defendant." And the court had special links to Congress, both
because it could receive cases by reference 12 and because implementation of
its remedies depended on congressional appropriations to provide pay-
ments. 13 Thus, the Court of Claims was marked by a jurisdiction dependent
upon the provision of the particular remedy (monetary awards) for a particu-
lar harm (breach of contract) and upon the presence of a particular defen-
dant (the United States).
By moving forward 150 years to the end of the twentieth century, we can
see the Court of Federal Claims in a different light. The court has ceased to
have such an unusual character. The source of change has not only been its
own reorganization,' 4 but the invention-during the intervening years-by
Congress of many other courts and agencies. Jurisdictional peculiarities, con-
gressional directions as to the forms and kinds of remedies permissible for
particular causes of action, and special kinds of judges for different kinds of
8 See generally Judith Resnik & Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning
the Role of Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1921 (2003).
9 See Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612, 612. Congress provided for the court,
then called the Court of Claims, to hear claimants seeking money from the federal government
because of a breach of contract. See generally Stanton J. Peelle, History and Jurisdiction of the
United States Court of Claims, 19 RECORDS OF THE COLUMBIA HISTORICAL SOCIETY 1 (1916).
10 See Act of Feb. 24, 1855, 10 Stat. at 612. The president appointed three judges, in turn
empowered to appoint commissioners to take testimony and to issue subpoenas.
11 Id.; see also Eric G. Bruggink, "Unfinished Business," 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 879, 881
(2003).
12 See Act of Feb. 24, 1855, 10 Stat. at 612 (The court "shall hear and determine all claims
which may be referred to said court by either house of Congress."). Remnants of that
jurisdiction remain. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1492, 375 (2000).
13 See Act of Feb. 24, 1855, 10 Stat. at 612.
14 Congress has revisited the structure of the Court of Claims several times. For example,
in 1866, Congress provided for direct enforcement of the judgments of the Court of Claims and
for review of its decisions by the Supreme Court. See Act of March 17, 1866, ch. 19, 14 Stat. 9.
In 1887, Congress expanded the court's powers by providing it with jurisdiction over all mone-
tary claims against the federal government. See Tucker Act, ch. 359, § 1, 24 Stat. 505, 505 (1887)
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2000)).
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cases have all become the ordinary stuff of federal litigation. 15 While once,
the Court of Federal Claims was ahead of the curve, it is no longer. True, it is
now a hodgepodge, with an odd assortment of kinds of cases (including pub-
lic contracts, tax matters, Fifth Amendment takings, civilian and military pay
claims, and vaccine litigation) 16 and some remedial range. But today it is one
of several such hodgepodges among the adjudicatory institutions that com-
prise the federal system.
Indeed, Article III courts are themselves composites, no longer purely
populated by Article III judges. Although one could make the equation be-
tween an Article III court and an Article III judge 100 years ago,' 7 it is a
mistake to now assume that so-called Article III courts are populated either
exclusively or even predominantly by life-tenured judges. The configuration
of the current Court of Federal Claims, with two cohorts of non-life-tenured
trial judges (Court of Federal Claims judges18 and "special masters"'19 dedi-
cated to working on cases involving vaccines 2°), resembles the configuration
of the federal district courts, with two layers of non-life-tenured judges (mag-
istrate judges and bankruptcy judges) joining life-tenured district court
judges. Moreover, in today's "Article III" courts, non-life-tenured judges
outnumber those with life tenure on the trial bench.
By looking inside Article III courts, we can see that they have lost their
Article III-ness if it is defined in terms of the way in which their judges are
15 Many such courts exist. One example is the evolution of the United States Tax Court
("Tax Court") from its origins in 1924 as the United States Board of Tax Appeals ("Board") to
its current status as a court within the judicial branch. See Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234,
§ 900(a), 43 Stat. 253, 336 (creating the Board); Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, §§ 1001(a), 1002, 42
Stat. 9, 109-10 (providing for direct appeals to the circuit courts); Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619,
§ 504(a), 56 Stat. 798, 957 (creating the Tax Court); Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172,
§ 951, 83 Stat. 487, 730 (shifting the institution from being an executive agency to the judicial
branch). From the legislative history of the 1948 reorganization of the Judicial Code, Title 28,
one learns that drafters had proposed to bring the Tax Court within the judicial branch in the
late 1940s. A debate, however, emerged about whether accountants, admitted to practice before
the Tax Court, would be eligible to represent disputants in the Tax Court, were it to be based in
the judiciary. The proponents retreated. See Judicial Code and Judiciary: Hearing on H.R. 3214
Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Judiciary, 80th Cong. 15-16 (1948) (statements of
Chauncey W. Reed, congressman and Edward Devitt, congressman); id. at 167 (statement of
W.A. Sutherland, American Bar Association).
16 See Schooner, supra note 1, at 721-36 (presenting an overview of the docket and data
on the work that occupies the time of the court).
17 In 1901, life-tenured judges numbered 116; 70 served on the district courts. See History
of Federal Judgeships, tblK, http://www.uscourts.gov/history/tablek.pdf (last visited Jan. 1, 2001)
[hereinafter Authorized Judgeships]. This table listed one Article I judgeship as of that date. Id.
Not included are United States commissioners, whose offices began with the First Judiciary Act.
Commissioners, paid on a fee-for-service basis, undertook tasks sometimes seen to be "judicial
in nature," such as administering oaths and issuing warrants, but often described as more "minis-
terial" than judicial. The deployment of such persons built on English practice, in which justices
of the peace-typically not lawyers-provided such assistance to the common-law courts.
18 See 28 U.S.C. § 172.
19 See id. § 789(c). The Chief Judge of the Court of Federal Claims has authority to ap-
point special masters. See FED. CL. R. App. B, http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/RulesUpdate%20
51.702/Rulesl-13-03.pdf.
20 See 42 U.S.C. § 300AA-1 et seq. (2000) (providing for the Court of Federal Claims to
handle vaccine compensation cases).
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appointed and serve. A few figures illuminate both the changes and the cur-
rent composition of the federal trial bench. Consider first the growth in the
numbers of life-tenured judges. As Figure 1 illustrates, in 1901, federal trial
judgeships were exclusively life-tenured, and, at the beginning of the century,
about seventy judges served. 21 As of 2001, more than 660 positions had been
authorized, evidencing the enormous growth in demand for federal adjudica-
tion. In addition to authorized judgeships, senior judges may also continue to
work, resulting in a larger number of judicial officers than the number of
authorized judgeships. 22 For clarity, given that all these judges enjoy the con-
stitutional attributes of life tenure and salary protections, I term them consti-
tutional judges.
Figure 1. Authorized Article III Federal District Court Judgeships,










As Figure 2 below shows, however, the first picture does not include all
who work as judges in "Article III courts." In 1968, Congress invented mag-
istrate judges. The legislature upgraded the prior system of United States
commissioners by creating a new statutory position to assist Article III judges
in a variety of tasks, including the pretrial processes of civil litigation and
criminal matters.2Z3 As Figure 2 details, in the 1960s and 1970s, the job was
conceived primarily as a part-time task. Some 450 slots were made available,
with relatively few (about 80) full-time positions.
Within thirty years, however, the numbers had flipped, and the name
had changed. Today, some 470 people serve full-time in the position of mag-
istrate judge.24 Just a smattering of part-time positions (under sixty) remain
across the ninety-four districts. The 1990 change in title from "magistrate" to
21 The data come from Authorized Judgeships, supra note 17.
22 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 294(b), 371 (b)(1).
23 See generally Federal Magistrates Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1107.
24 See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 321, 104 Stat. 508, 5117
(codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 631).
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Figure 2. Magistrate Judgeships: 1971 & 2001
Full-Time Part-Time
"magistrate judge" aptly captures the array of tasks now delegated. Between
1968, when Congress created the position, and 1990, when Congress renamed
it, the legislature expanded magistrate judges' mandate to permit them to
make more decisions in more kinds of proceedings.2 - Today, magistrate and
bankruptcy judges have an array of responsibilities, including the power to
issue certain kinds of contempt orders26 and to preside, with parties' consent,
at jury trials.
27
Figure 3 brings us to another set of non-Article III judges-bankruptcy
judges-also working inside Article III courts. In the late 1970s, Congress
crafted a position28 for bankruptcy judges that the Supreme Court held un-
25 See, e.g., Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-577, § 1, 90 Stat. 2729, 2729 (authorizing
magistrates to make preliminary reviews in certain instances, to receive evidence, and to make
proposed findings of fact); Act of Oct. 10, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-82, 93 Stat. 643, 643 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 604, 634-636, 1915(b) and 18 U.S.C. § 3401) (providing authority for
the trial of civil cases if the parties consent and for a broader criminal misdemeanor jurisdiction).
See generally ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, A GUIDE TO T HE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATE JUDGES SYSTEM (1995).
26 See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-518, § 202,114 Stat. 2410,
2412 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 179, 613) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 636(e) to provide magistrate
judges with contempt powers for action occurring in their presence and obstructing the "admin-
istration of justice"); Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, 2555
(codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. and scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) (providing bankruptcy
judges with forms of contempt authority); BANKR. R. 9020 (detailing the procedures by which
bankruptcy judges are to conduct contempt proceedings).
27 See 28 U.S.C. § 157(e) (empowering bankruptcy judges, "if specially designated" by the
district courts and upon "express consent of all parties," to conduct jury trials); id.
§ 636(c)(1)-(3) (empowering magistrate judges to preside at civil jury trials if the parties
consent).
28 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 92 Stat. at 2555.
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constitutional because of too broad a delegation of jurisdiction to
non-Article III decisionmakers.29 The 1984 revisions responded with a
somewhat narrower portfolio and authorized 230 bankruptcy judgeships.
30
By the end of the twentieth century, their number had also grown such that
some 325 now sit in the federal district courts.












For clarity, I refer to magistrate and bankruptcy judges as statutory
judges because Congress has commissioned them to serve for fixed (and re-
newable) terms. Further, Congress has provided that life-tenured judges do
the selection and the reappointment of both sets of judges.3 1 One structural
distinction between the two sets of statutory judges is that bankruptcy judge-
ships, like Article III judgeships, require that Congress authorize each indi-
vidual judgeship line. Magistrate judgeships, in contrast, can be created
directly by the Judicial Conference of the United States, which has the statu-
tory power to add positions subject to the availability of funds.
32
The bottom line is that Article III courts are not so "Article III" any-
more. Indeed, at the trial level and within the Article III branch of govern-
ment, more judgeships lack life tenure than have it. As of 2001, some 800
29 See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982) (striking
the 1978 statute). Justice Brennan wrote for the plurality of four. Justice Rehnquist and Justice
O'Connor concurred that, by permitting bankruptcy judges to rule on related state law claims,
Congress had unconstitutionally vested non-life-tenured judges with power over disputes that
had been the "stuff of Westminster." Id. at 89. See generally Eric A. Posner, The Political Econ-
omy of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 96 MICH. L. REV. 47 (1996).
30 See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98
Stat. 333, 336-38 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C., most
pertinently at 28 U.S.C. §§ 151-158).
31 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 151-152 (bankruptcy judges appointed for fourteen-year terms by ap-
pellate judges of that circuit); id. § 631(e) (magistrate judges appointed for eight-year terms by
district judges).
32 Id. § 631(a).
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judgeships are designated for bankruptcy and magistrate judges in contrast to
about 665 authorized for district court judges.33 Figure 4 depicts that alloca-
tion. Further, disaggregation of the data is also appropriate. As of 2001, in
six federal district courts, the number of magistrate judges was greater than
the number of life-tenured judges.34 In another sixteen districts, their num-
bers were equal. 35 In some districts, magistrate judges are "on the wheel,"
assigned to civil litigants when a case is filed. In the District of Oregon, for
example, litigants have an equal chance of being assigned a magistrate or a
district judge.
36
Figure 4. Authorized Trial-Level Federal Judgeships in Article III
Courts. Nationwide: 2001
Art. III: District Court, Magistrate & Bankruptcy
Life-Tenured Judgeships Judgeships
D Article III District Court (665) EZBankruptcy (324) E]Magistrate: Full-Time (471)
D Magistrate: Part-Time (59) ] Magistrate: Combination (3)
33 See 2001 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS tbi.12, 13, 14 (2001), http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2001/contents.html.
Authorized Judgeships, supra note 17, has a slightly different count, listing 641 permanent and 10
temporary judgeships.
34 As of January 2001, those districts were the Middle and Southern Districts of Alabama;
the Western District of New York; the Eastern and Southern Districts of California; and the
Western District of Texas. Telephone Interview with Staff, Magistrates Division, Administrative
Office of the United States Courts (Jan. 9, 2001).
35 Id. Those districts were in New Mexico; Arizona; the Northern District of New York;
the Virgin Islands; the Western District of North Carolina; the Middle District of Louisiana; the
Northern District of Mississippi; the Western District of Michigan; the Eastern District of Ar-
kansas; the Northern and Southern Districts of Iowa, North Dakota, Idaho, Montana, and Ore-
gon; and the Southern District of Georgia.
36 See D. OR. R. 72.1 ("The District of Oregon includes magistrate judges in the random
assignment of new civil cases filings."). As noted, the District of Oregon is one with equal num-
bers of magistrate and of life-tenured trial judges. See supra, note 35. Consent for trial, how-
ever, cannot be inferred by a litigant's decision not to object to that assignment. See Hajek v.
Burlington N. R.R. Co., 186 F.3d 1105, 1108 (9th Cir. 1999). But consent can be inferred from a
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As is familiar to many government lawyers and judges, my discussion
thus far has not accounted for a host of other federal courts, some of which
used to be called "Article I" courts, some of which are called agencies, and
all of which provide adjudication-a good deal of it against the United States
government-to thousands of claimants. Figure 5 permits a summary of
those numbers, which includes the Court of Federal Claims.
Figure 5. Authorized Federal Judgeships, Including Article I Courts







Life-Tenured Art. Il (Supreme, Non-Article Ill (ALJs, D.C. Superior
Appellate, District, Court of Courts, Article I Courts, Magistrate,
International Trade): 862 and Bankruptcy) : 2339
[]Article III Court (862) L-Bankruptcy & Magistrate (857) E]Article I Courts (46)
[]D.C. Superior Courts (66) [ALJs (1370)
A word of explanation of the numbers is in order. Included are only
those judges serving on courts listed in a federal database under the heading
of "Article I" courts 37 and those administrative law judges who hold office
pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 38 As administrative
lawyers know well, however, agencies often rely on other officials (with vari-
ous titles such as administrative judge and hearing officer) who also adjudi-
cate but who work without the structural protections of the APA. Estimates
are that about 2,000 such positions exist. 39 I have used the smaller set of only
Article I and APA judges, but even that group-2,300 or so-towers over all
litigant's participation in a trial after notice has been provided of an opportunity to demur. See
Roell v. Withrow, 123 S. Ct. 1696, 1699 (2003).
37 See Authorized Judgeships, supra note 17.
38 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (2000).
39 See John H. Frye, III, Survey of Non-ALJ Hearing Programs in the Federal Government,
44 ADMIN. L. REV. 261, 349 (1992); Paul R. Verkuil, Reflections Upon the Federal Administrative
Judiciary, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1344-46 (1992).
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the life-tenured federal judges, numbering in the 800s in both trial and appel-
late courts.
40
These charts help one realize that the current structure of the Court of
Federal Claims-with non-Article III judges sitting underneath an appellate
group of Article III judges-is no longer an unusual arrangement. More-
over, the 1982 legislation that generated both the current Court of Federal
Claims and the Federal Circuit is likely to provide a template for the future.
My assumption is that one hundred years from now, life tenured judges will
at best comprise about one quarter of the federal judicial work force and will
mostly do appellate work, reviewing decisions of non-Article III judges. In
short, the rest of the landscape of the federal system is catching up with the
Court of Federal Claims.
III. Legitimating the Ingenuity
What flows from an understanding of the changing composition of the
federal trial courts? A first conclusion is the diminished coherence of at-
tempting to contrast Article I courts with Article III courts. Indeed, given
the amalgam of actors within the system, that vocabulary no longer serves us
well. We can be clearer if we identify judges (rather than courts) as either
Article III or non-Article III judges or use the terms constitutional and stat-
utory judges.
The legality of the current system brings me to my second conclusion-
that, during the twentieth century, a major shift in the understanding of Arti-
cle III itself took place. Interpretations by the Supreme Court about the con-
stitutional meaning of Article III are predicates to the system we have begun
to take for granted.41 Recall that a 1932 Supreme Court decision (Crowell v.
Benson42) refused to permit the delegation of "jurisdictional facts" to admin-
istrative hearing officers in a dispute about damages owed when a longshore-
man fell. Compare that with a 1985 Supreme Court decision (Thomas v.
Union Carbide43), concluding that Congress could constitutionally give an ar-
bitrator virtually final authority to decide a monetary dispute between pri-
vate litigants seeking redress under a statutory scheme.
The blossoming of agency-based adjudication became clear in the 2002
term. In Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Author-
40 The number of life-tenured judges comes from the 2001 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DI-
RECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTs 35 tbl.12 (2001),
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus200l/front/2001arttext.pdf.
41 See generally Judith Resnik, The Mythic Meaning of Article III Courts, 56 U. CoLo. L.
REV. 581 (1985) (analyzing the concerns for independent judges and the history of increasing
toleration of non-Article III federal judges); Craig A. Stern, What's a Constitution Among
Friends? Unbalancing Article 111, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1043 (1998) (arguing that some of the
recent court-like activities are not exercises of the "judicial power" subject to Article III's
constraints).
42 Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62-63 (1932) (permitting initial factfinding by a hearing
officer but retaining Article III authority to review jurisdictional facts de novo).
43 Thomas v. Union Carbide, 473 U.S. 568, 594 (1985) (upholding provisions in the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, to commit final decision-making, absent claims of
fraud, to arbitration).
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ity,44 the Supreme Court held that states, able to assert sovereign immunity
claims in federal courts, could do the same in agency-based adjudication.
The five person majority reiterated what the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit had said about the administrative adjudicatory
processes of the Federal Maritime Commission, that the proceeding "walks,
talks, and squawks very much like a lawsuit" and that its "placement within
the Executive branch cannot blind us to the fact that the proceeding is truly
an adjudication. '45 As the Fourth Circuit had put it: "Administrative judges
are what the name says they are-judges.
'46
This shift in doctrine and in practices has been driven by deeply prag-
matic instincts-the need to staff cases, to cope with growing dockets, to
avoid confrontations with Congress, and to respond to litigants' needs and
rights.47 But the authorization of judgeships outside of Article III was not
only responsive to such pressures. It was also inventive, aimed at reshaping
and professionalizing judicial roles as the country itself was moving toward a
nationalized economic structure. Further, the developments in this area of
constitutional law were of a piece with other twentieth-century readings of
the Constitution, also expanding the flexibility of national governance. 48
In sum, in the nineteenth century, the Court of Claims marked a frontier
by anticipating structural developments of the twentieth century in terms of
populating federal adjudication with non-life-tenured judges. The legality of
those innovations depended on a significant change brought about by the
interaction between the Supreme Court and Congress on the variations in
forms of federal adjudication sustainable under Article III.
IV. Evaluating the Court of Federal Claims
Given these developments, Professor Schooner properly raises questions
about the continued coherence of this court (and inferentially, about other
specialty adjudicatory arrangements within the federal system). Whether
having a Court of Federal Claims makes sense in 2002 thus depends on what
metrics are used. Professors Schooner and Sisk rely on jurisdictional distinc-
tiveness as a measure of the propriety of the Court of Federal Claims. Pro-
fessor Schooner argues that, lacking any, the court should cease to exist,49
while Professor Sisk seeks to etch brighter jurisdictional divisions.50 Judges
Smith and Plager offer another approach, focused on the social utility of the
44 Fed. Maritime Comm'n. v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002).
45 Id. at 751 (quoting S.C. State Ports Auth. v. Fed. Maritime Comm'n., 243 F.3d 165, 174
(4th Cir. 2001)).
46 S.C. State Ports Auth., 243 F.3d at 174.
47 The pragmatism is sometimes explicit. See, e.g., Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530,
540 (1962) (discussing the utility of understanding the United States Court of Customs and Pat-
ent Appeals as an Article III court because, with such denomination, other Article III judges
could be designated to comprise a quorum).
48 See Resnik, Inventing the Federal District Courts, supra note 5, at 625-43, 647-49 (ana-
lyzing the factors contributing to these developments).
49 Schooner, supra note 1, at 717-21.
5o Sisk, supra note 4, at 606, 676-87, 691-93.
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court as an institution specifically identified with challenges to government
actions.
5 1
The disagreements among the four stem from their reliance on different
metrics, ranging from data on w6rkload and volume to the blurring of identi-
ties based on jurisdictional differences to the symbolic import of having a
discrete court that marks the right of citizens to bring suits against their gov-
ernment. But the authors all share an assumption that this adjudicatory insti-
tution needs to be explained by reference to its unique charter, which is the
question to which I turn below.
V. Formalism, Functionalism, and the Court of Federal Claims
At a formal level, the court is identified as focused on a singular remedy
(money damages) and permits lawsuits against a particular defendant (the
federal government). But happily, as the articles in this volume detail, the
Court of Federal Claims is no longer unique in being a place from which to
gain money damages from the federal government. So-called regular district
courts may award such relief under the Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA),
52
through the "Little" Tucker Act,53 through other constitutional or statutory
provisions, 54 and by virtue of the Supreme Court's interpretation in Bowen v.
Massachusetts55 that under the APA, sometimes money can be a form of re-
lief permitted.56 Moreover, agency boards (such as the Board of Contract
Appeals) have a lively trade in such claims as well.57 And we could concep-
tualize recipients of federal benefits (such as social security claimants) as ar-
guing that the government has breached its contractual obligations and
money is due. Further, as Professor Seamon instructs, the Court of Federal
Claims has some cases in which it too can provide forms of equitable relief-
specifically in employment disputes.
58
What are we to make of this multiplicity of fora for and forms of relief
against the government? For Professor Schooner, it calls the very existence
of the Court of Federal Claims into question.59 For Professor Sisk, it prompts
an interest in sharpening the special character of the Court of Federal Claims
by eliminating competing venues that provide monetary relief based on con-
51 Plager, supra note 3, at 796-97; Smith, supra note 2, at 773-75.
52 Federal Torts Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (2000).
53 Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (providing the district courts with concurrent juris-
diction over nontort claims seeking up to $10,000 in damages).
54 Private lawsuits may be pursued through reliance on implied causes of action under the
Constitution. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 395-96 (1971). That decision's import was recently limited by a sharply divided
court. See Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66 (2001).
55 Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879 (1988).
56 Id. at 912.
57 See Contract Disputes Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 601-613 (2000); see also Schooner, supra note
1, at 753-67 (discussing the overlap and similarities between the Court of Federal Claims and the
Board of Contract Appeals).
58 Richard H. Seamon, The Provenance of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, 71
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 543, 550 (2003).
59 See Schooner, supra note 1, at 716, 772.
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tract claims against the government. 60 Such proposals rely on formal concep-
tions of distinctions between law and equity and between Article I and
Article III courts.61 Were one to limit the availability of monetary relief in
federal district courts either through statutory amendment or by case law
interpretation, the Court of Federal Claims might conform more closely to its
nineteenth-century roots.
But narrowing the range of remedies would render such institutions
backward looking, divesting them of their contemporary functional charac-
ter. Just as one reform of the twentieth century was to reread Article III so
as permit the manufacture of scores of federal judges who lacked Article III
attributes, another reform of the twentieth century was to collapse the dis-
tinctions between law and equity. The great procedural project of the twenti-
eth century was the promulgation in 1938 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 62 Those rules are premised on the merger of law and equity, on
the easy joinder of claims and parties-all to enable a single lawsuit to dis-
pose at one time with all claims arising from a common nucleus of facts.
Proposals to return the Court of Federal Claims to a singular focus on mone-
tary relief or to limit district courts to prevent them from providing monetary
relief against the United States entail a retreat from the functionalism that
permeates the Federal Rules.
As we enter the twenty-first century, however, that very effort-to re-
create sharp divides between forms of relief-has been undertaken by a nar-
row majority of the Supreme Court.63 As Professor Sisk noted,64 in 2002 the
Supreme Court interpreted a provision of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA) 65 that addressed the remedial powers of federal
judges. The Court held that when Congress authorized federal judges to pro-
vide "appropriate equitable relief," Congress had not also empowered fed-
eral judges to award monetary relief, classified as a remedy at law.66 Absent
congressional specification of such power, federal judges lacked it. That deci-
sion-Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson-was five to
60 See Sisk, supra note 4, at 688 (proposing to "except all claims for monetary relief, how-
ever defined or characterized," from judicial review provided through the APA). In contrast,
Professor Sisk does not oppose the development within the Court of Federal Claims repertoire
of "certain limited injunctive or declaratory relief collateral to a money claim." Id. at 687.
61 See Stern, supra note 41, at 1072-75 (arguing for reliance on formal distinctions between
Article I and Article III courts). But see Resnik, Inventing the Federal District Courts, supra note
5, at 629-43 (delineating the overlapping charters and the efforts to make distinctions among the
kinds of judges). As Paul Bator commented, "The Supreme Court opinions devoted to the sub-
ject of the validity of legislative and administrative tribunals are as troubled, arcane, confused
and confusing as could be imagined." Paul M. Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: Legisla-
tive and Administrative Courts Under Article I1, 65 IND. L. REv. 233, 239 (1990).
62 See Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071 et seq. (2000) (first enacted in 1934). Pursu-
ant to that legislation, the Court transmitted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to Congress
on January 3, 1938, to become effective the following September. See Order Adopting Rules of
Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States, 308 U.S. 645, 651 (1939).
63 See generally Resnik, Constricting Remedies, supra note 6.
64 Sisk, supra note 4, at 678-79.
65 The statute in question authorizes federal judges to provide "appropriate equitable re-
lief." See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B) (2000).
66 Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 221 (2002).
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four, with Justice Scalia writing for a majority that included the Chief Justice
and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas.67 That majority has become
familiar through cases addressing congressional powers under the Commerce
Clause, the Eleventh Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment. 68 An-
other ruling of relevance comes from a decision in 1999 (with the same con-
figuration of justices) in which Justice Scalia, again writing for the majority,
concluded that when a litigant is seeking monetary damages in federal court,
federal judges lack the power to provide an interim injunction, freezing
assets.
69
A quick summary is that this majority has narrowed the power of life-
tenured federal judges to provide remedies. If litigants have statutory rights
to equitable relief, Article III judges have been told that they lack power to
provide legal relief. And if litigants seek legal relief, courts cannot provide
interim equitable remedies. 70 In the decisions, the majority argued that these
doctrines reflect accurately the division between law and equity in 1789 and
that such distinctions ought to govern federal judicial power today. Not all
specialists on English or American equity share that view. 71 Rather, they
point to examples of broader exercises of common-law power by early fed-
eral judges as well as to the conception that equity is itself founded on
flexibility.
72
Professor Sisk's approach bears some resemblance to the resurgence of
formalism adopted by the current majority on the Supreme Court. To justify
the existence of the Court of Federal Claims by shoring up a distinction be-
tween legal and equitable remedies and by attempting to harden a line be-
tween prospective and retrospective relief would impose high costs. The
67 The majority held that, while restitution was a remedy at equity as well as at law, the
form of restitution ordered was not equitable. Id. at 212-13. Justice Ginsburg, writing on behalf
of herself and Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, disagreed. Id. at 224. Justice Stevens also
filed a separate dissent. Id. at 221.
68 See, e.g., Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 370-74 (2001)
(striking an application of the Americans with Disabilities Act to states on the grounds that
Congress lacked sufficient evidence of that form of disability-based discrimination by the states);
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (striking the Civil Rights Remedy of the
Violence Against Women Act as beyond congressional powers to regulate commerce or to en-
force the Fourteenth Amendment); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999) (holding that states
could not be sued by private individuals for damages in state court for violations of the Federal
Labor Standards Act).
69 See Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 333
(1999). The term in many common law countries for such an injunction is a Mareva injunction,
named after a leading 1975 English case. See Mareva Compani Naviera, S.A. v. Int'l Bulkcar-
riers, S.A., 2 Lloyd's Rep. 509 (C.A. 1975).
70 For an analysis of both cases, see Resnik, Constricting Remedies, supra note 6, at
231-72.
71 See John Langbein, What ERISA Means by "Equitable": The Supreme Court's Trail of
Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming Oct. 2003). See
generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the "Judicial
Power" in Statutory Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990 (2001).
72 See Eskridge, supra note 71, at 996-98; see also John F. Manning, Deriving Rules of
Statutory Interpretation from the Constitution, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1648, 1653-54 (2001) (ap-
proving of a narrow reading of judicial power but agreeing with Professor Eskridge that some
early decisions of federal judges provide examples of broad remedial approaches).
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movement toward functionalism during the twentieth century was predicated
on the inefficiencies of attempting to circumscribe disputes by the remedy
requested. Moreover, even as the Supreme Court itself has drawn lines be-
tween the grant of prospective and retrospective relief against governments,
it has noted the difficulty of delineating between remedies that respond to
future problems and those aimed at past injuries. 73 Both forms of relief can
have monetary impact on government treasuries,74 as Professor Vicki Jackson
ably demonstrates in her discussion of the history of monetary claims against
the federal government and particularly of the case of Kendall v. Stokes.
75
VI. Common Law and Constitutional Remedies
Against Governments
Judges-who came together to celebrate the birth of the Court of Fed-
eral Claims-should be leery of constricting the remedial capacities of the
federal courts. Specifically, the powers of both the Court of Federal Claims
and of the Federal Circuit could be clipped under such an approach. The
Supreme Court cases to which I alluded above proceed from the predicate
that Article III courts lack the power to make federal common law.76 I-and
others-think that view wrong as a matter of history, constitutional interpre-
tation, and policy.77 Indeed, the work of the Court of Federal Claims pro-
vides an example of the desirability of the federal common-law process, here
focused on developing the common law of federal contracts. Elaboration of
the rights and obligations of government contracts often proceed without de-
tailed statutes providing rules of decision. As theorists of common lawmak-
ing explain, its utility lies in the ability to shape rules to build from direct
experiences with a range of fact patterns.
78
Could the Court of Federal Claims continue to do common-law interpre-
tation, were the Supreme Court to limit further that power in cases stemming
73 See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordon, 415 U.S. 651, 667 (1974) (imposing a line between permis-
sible prospective and impermissible retrospective relief against states but noting that, as "in most
areas of the law, the difference between the type of relief barred by the Eleventh Amendment
and that permitted under Ex Parte Young will not in many instances be that between day and
night").
74 See Vicki C. Jackson, Suing the Federal Government: Sovereignty, Immunity, and Judicial
Independence, 35 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 521, 525 (2003).
75 Kendall v. Stokes, 37 U.S. 524, 626 (1838) (affirming the judgment of the Circuit Court
of the District of Columbia that ordered a writ of mandamus against a postmaster to compel
performance that required the postmaster to credit relators under their contracts for the trans-
portation of mail for the United States), discussed in Jackson, supra note 74.
76 See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of the United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, reprinted in A MAITER OF IN-
TERPRETATION 13 (Amy Guttman ed. 1997) (arguing that, in "the federal courts . . . with a
qualification so small it does not bear mentioning, there is no such thing as common law").
77 See Resnik, Constricting Remedies, supra note 6, at 235-41; see also Eskridge, supra
note 71; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist Court's Federalism
Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 481-82 (2002); Daniel Meltzer, The Supreme Court's Judicial
Passivity, 2002 Sup. CT. REV. 343 (2003).
78 See, e.g., David A. Strauss, The Common Law Genius of the Warren Court, 2002 U. CHI.
Pun. L. & LEGAL THEORY WORKING PAPER No. 25 (May 10, 2002), at http://papers.ssrn.com/
abstractid=315682.
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from other federal courts? Its work might be sheltered from general attacks
on federal common lawmaking by identifying this pocket of law as a peculiar
and unique federal interest, 79 or by construing its enabling statutes as con-
gressional grants of specific powers.80 But the underlying currents, against
remediation would likely inhibit the interpretive work of both the Court of
Federal Claims and the Federal Circuit. The Supreme Court majority op-
posed to federal common lawmaking is also loath to permit judge-made im-
plication or elaboration of remedies. 81 Further, some commentators assume
that non-life-tenured judges have less power than do life-tenured judges to
craft relief.
82
The recent retrenchment in judicial remedial capacity puts the Court of
Federal Claims at risk. Its powers could be similarly construed as limited.
And like other courts, its dependence on congressional delineation of its
powers is now greater. Were the Court of Federal Claims to make rulings
perceived to be hostile to governmental interests, it could spark a negative
reaction from Congress. Yet the very purpose of the Court of Federal Claims
is to enable those arguing harm from the government to obtain redress. In-
creasing courts dependence on the government that they judge undercuts the
political and symbolic import of the ability to call government to account.
Further, such constraints reverse the historical trend giving the Court of Fed-
eral Claims greater autonomy to enforce judgments against the government.
Both Professor Schooner and Professor Sisk erroneously proceed from
the assumption that the existence of the Court must be justified by a peculiar
mandate. The history of the fabrication of courts in the United States is not
one of coherent institutional design but one of politics. As Professor Daniel
Meador detailed in his oral account of the 1982 legislation that created the
current Court of Federal Claims, the Department of Justice had considered
an institution comprised of Article III trial judges but, to avoid opposition
from the Judicial Conference of the United States, relied on non-life-tenured
judges instead. 83 As Judge Bruggink noted, the current contours of the Fed-
eral Circuit also represent a compromise, resulting in a court with a special
79 See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988) (creating, in an opinion by
Justice Scalia, the federal common-law rule immunizing government contractors in certain
cases).
80 See Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 318,
321-22 (1999) (discussing the power of Congress to imbue federal courts with remedial author-
ity, if expressly conferred).
81 See, e.g., Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 279-80 (2002) (concluding that courts
ought not to imply a cause of action from federal statutes); Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534
U.S. 61, 71-72 (2001) (declining to imply a damage action under the Constitution on behalf of a
prisoner allegedly harmed by a contractor with the Federal Bureau of Prisons); Alexander v.
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001) (holding that regulations to remedy discrimination cannot be
the basis for an implied private action).
82 See Leandra Lederman, Equity and the Article I Court: Is the Tax Court's Exercise of
Equitable Powers Constitutional?, 5 FLA. L. REV. 357, 360-61 (2001) (cautioning that Article I
courts have limited sources of equitable powers).
83 Daniel J. Meador, Origin of the "Claims Court," 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 599, 600
(2003).
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focus on patents as well as a general mandate that reduced opposition from
constituencies concerned about overspecialization. 84
Rather than bemoan the lack of distinctiveness of the Court of Federal
Claims, one ought to be glad that the peculiarities that marked this court's
existence have diminished. While once it was unusual to obtain relief against
the United States, today-happily-it is less unusual. The enactment of the
FTCA and the APA are proud additions to the legislation providing for
claims in contract against the United States. Likewise, the development of
entitlement theory endowing recipients of federal benefits with rights against
the United States is also to be celebrated.
85
The capacity of individuals to obtain a wide range of remedies against
governments under different jurisdictional provisions and in different institu-
tions is a positive step in bringing to fruition Abraham Lincoln's promise that
adorns the Court of Federal Claims: "It is as much the duty of government to
render prompt justice against itself, in favor of citizens, as it is to administer
the same between private individuals.
''86
Thus, interpretations such as Bowen v. Massachusetts, permitting money
relief in some instances under the APA,87 might be used as examples of the
need for the Court of Federal Claims to seek revision of its own charter to
include more authority to provide appropriate equitable remedies. Further,
perhaps through rulemaking or statutes, other innovations are in order-to
enable the joinder of parties (such as subcontractors), to permit intervention
and class actions-all to enable the Court of Federal Claims to function as a
modern court, focused on parties' needs for remedies. 88 Rather than call for
the demise of the Court of Federal Claims, one could support it as one of
dozens of particular litigating schemes, crafted in an effort to capture a spe-
cific set of problems-akin to administrative adjudication in the Social Secur-
ity Administration, the Tax Court, the Veterans Claims Court, and the like.
Moreover, one might worry about centralizing too much adjudication
related to the government in a single forum and see, in the current overlap of
jurisdictional mandates detailed by Professor Schooner, some protection
against capture by such a powerful litigant as the United States. As Professor
Jackson has explained,89 the activity of making governments responsible to
84 See Eric G. Bruggink, supra note 11, at 879 n.2 (commenting that the linkage between
the Court of Federal Claims and the Federal Circuit came, in part, from the "serendipity" that
both courts were housed in the same facility and in part to lessen the "mono-thematic" aspect of
the Federal Circuit, created to centralize patent appeals).
85 See Charles A. Reich, Beyond the New Property: An Ecological View of Due Process, 56
BROOK. L. REV. 731 (1990); Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
86 CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1861). That quote is engraved in the lobby of the
courthouse of the Court of Federal Claims, and it adorned the brochure for the Conference
celebrating the twentieth anniversary of the court.
87 Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 912 (1988); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
Claims Court at the Crossroads, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 517 (1991) (discussing the implications of
that decision and its importance in light of the need to hold governments responsible for their
actions).
88 See Madsen & Smith, supra note 7, at 15-22 (suggesting revisions to provide litigants
with the ability to join multiple parties in the Court of Federal Claims).
89 Jackson, supra note 74.
20031
HeinOnline -- 71 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 815 2003
The George Washington Law Review
their citizenry puts judges at risk of incurring the displeasure of either legisla-
tures, the Executive, or specific constituencies. Spreading that work across
several courts and agencies may deflect such anger and buffer judges from
protests aimed at undermining their authority. The Court of Federal Claims
would then become normalized as part of a variegated landscape dotted by a
variety of adjudicatory configurations.
But appreciation for the utility of redundant jurisdictional grants90 need
not result in an assumption that the current mix is optimal. One question-
unanswered empirically by the papers presented at the Conference-relates
to whether that redundancy burdens or creates systematic advantages for any
classes of litigants. 91 Another is the sufficiency of the authority of the institu-
tions providing redress against the government. As both Judge Smith and
Judge Plager have explained, the Court of Federal Claims stands as a symbol
that the United States can be called to account. But, as we have learned from
the discussion of the remedies provided in some European countries, 92 the
reality may still fall short of providing full redress. Several countries impose
more obligations on their governments than does the United States. Further,
in the United States, we have used life tenure to mark judges of special im-
port, but Court of Federal Claims judges do not have that status. Thus, the
twentieth anniversary of the Court of Federal Claims ought to be the occa-
sion on which to address the need for broader jurisdictional mandates and
greater judicial independence as means to fulfill the promise made in the
nineteenth century to adjudicate claims against the government.
To conclude, the puzzling aspects of the Court of Federal Claims should
be assessed from the vantage point of federal adjudication more generally.
First, the Court was once a major innovation but is no longer. It foreshad-
owed a tremendous growth in adjudicatory possibilities through the
fabrication of many federal courts, today called courts or agencies, and
staffed by constitutional and statutory judges. Second, as Professor Vicki
Jackson has detailed, the creation of the Court of Federal Claims was consis-
tent with the promise of Marbury v. Madison93 to provide legal redress when
government wronged individuals. 94 That commitment to the rule of law has
prompted Congress to enact other statutory mechanisms (such as the APA
90 Several years ago, Robert Cover articulated the many benefits of jurisdictional redun-
dancy, then focused on the replication and overlap between state and federal court systems. See
Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Innovation, 22
WM. & MARY L. REV. 639 (1981).
91 See Madsen & Smith, supra note 7, at 825, 832-35 (discussing the need for a "level
playing field" and raising concerns about the burdens on contractors of disagreeing with the
government).
92 See James E. Pfander, Government Accountability in Europe: A Comparative Assess-
ment, 35 GEo. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 611 (2003) (comparing the failure of the common law in the
United States to respond, as does the French system, to enforce government accountability and
provide individual awards of damages for wrongful acts by government); Rolf Sturner, Suing the
Sovereign in Europe and Germany, 35 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 663 (2003) (discussing the
availability of making claims against governments in a variety of fora rather than the concentra-
tion in a single court).
93 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
94 Jackson, supra note 74.
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and the FTCA) and to locate jurisdiction for claims against the government
in both courts and agencies.
Third, and finally, one can agree with Professor Schooner that the court
cannot easily be justified by reference to economies of scale or forms of ex-
pertise and also agree with Judges Smith and Plager that the court might
nevertheless be an institution desirable to maintain-which is to accept the
idea that, for the court "to make sense" does not require it to be peculiar.
But a comfort with the propriety of the ongoing existence of the court ought
not to result in complacency that its remedial regime suffices. Revisiting the
mandates of the many institutions that hear claims against government is in
order, with the goal of enlarging, rather than narrowing, their abilities to pro-
vide justice.
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Article III and Expanding the Power of
the United States Court of
Federal Claims
Craig A. Stern*
The Fifteenth Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Federal
Claims ("Court of Federal Claims") heard several proposals for expanding
the power of the court.' These proposals raise two questions: what constitu-
tional limits on the power of this court exist because it is an Article I court
rather than an Article III court, and what advantages this organization under
Article I gives the court.
In 1855, Congress created the United States Court of Claims ("Court of
Claims") to consider debts of the United States.2 Congress created the Court
of Claims pursuant to Article I, not Article 111. 3 The current descendant of
the Court of Claims is the Court of Federal Claims. Congress also created
this court to be an Article I court.4 This court, however, does more than
consider debts of the United States. It also has authority to order nonmone-
tary relief in some cases.5 The authority to grant nonmonetary relief makes
the court an attractive forum for claims that would otherwise be brought
elsewhere, notwithstanding the fact that those cases seek money from the
federal treasury-the very sort of relief that the Court of Federal Claims ex-
ists to provide. For example, claims by federal or military personnel for back
pay may be brought along with claims for reinstatement or correction of
records. 6 Without the power to award relief for these latter claims, the court
would be a less hospitable forum. For cases in which a part must be filed in
this court or nowhere, allowing this court also to grant nonmonetary relief
prevents the expense and waste for both the claimant and the federal govern-
ment that forcing the claimant to split its case would cause.
* Professor, Regent University Law School; B.A. 1975, Yale University; J.D. 1978, Uni-
versity of Virginia. The author thanks the Honorable Eric G. Bruggink for the invitation to
participate in the Fifteenth Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Federal Claims,
Professor Steven L. Schooner for his encouragement and advice, and Mary Bunch, John Tuskey,
David Wagner, and Eric Welsh for their assistance.
I See, e.g., Marcia G. Madsen & Gregory A. Smith, The Court of Federal Claims in the
21st Century: Specific Proposals for Legislative Changes, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 824 (2003).
2 Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, § 1, 10 Stat. 612.
3 Eric G. Bruggink, "Unfinished Business," 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 879, 881 (2003).
4 See 28 U.S.C. § 171(a) (2000). Notwithstanding this designation and the fifteen-year
term for judges of the court, id. § 172(a), Congress has granted to judges of the court the option
to adopt extended senior status with no diminution in pay, id. § 178. Judges are removable "only
for incompetency, misconduct, neglect of duty, engaging in the practice of law, or physical or
mental disability." Id. § 176(a).
5 See, e.g., id. §§ 1491(a)(2), (b)(2).
6 See Gregory C. Sisk, The Tapestry Unravels: Statutory Waivers of Sovereign Immunity
and Money Claims Against the United States, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 602, 645-56 (2003).
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As an Article I court, the Court of Federal Claims is subject to con-
straints that Article III courts are not subject to but free of other constraints
that do govern Article III courts. According to the Constitution, the court
may not exercise "the judicial Power of the United States," because that
power is vested solely in the Article III courts-courts the judges of which
"hold their Offices during good Behaviour" and whose "Compensation...
shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office."'7 It may decide
questions of law, however, that have nothing to do with "cases" or
"controversies. "
The Article I status of the court well suits its chief role. Ordering that
money from the federal treasury be paid to claimants lies squarely within the
"public rights" category for Article I courts. 9 Were they to exercise "the judi-
cial Power of the United States," they would have to be courts vested with
such power, as only Article III courts may be. 10 But if they do not exercise
"the judicial Power of the United States," they may be established by Con-
gress with reference not to Article III, but only to the Article I powers of
Congress."
Every debtor must decide what claims to pay. Doing so is not an exer-
cise of judicial power, even when the debtor takes account of the law and
applies it to the claim. Only when a claim is lodged with a tribunal at some
distance from the debtor does deciding whether the claim should be honored
entail an exercise of the judicial power. 12 The Court of Federal Claims,
though a respected court and operationally independent of both the execu-
tive and the legislative branches, is strictly, as a constitutional matter, acting
for the federal government in determining what claims are to be paid.' 3 Ac-
cording to the public-rights theory, although the court must do this justly and
fairly with solicitude for claims against the federal government, it, nonethe-
less, is acting for the federal government.
Inasmuch as the court is an Article I court of the public-rights stripe, the
public-rights theory also would advocate that the Court of Federal Claims
not hear claims raising private rights-rights not entailing claims by or
against the federal government itself. Hearing such claims would require the
court to exercise judicial power rather than to act as an organ of the federal
government by determining what claims against it ought to be honored. Con-
versely, however, the court is authorized to issue advisory opinions in dis-
charging its duty under its congressional reference power, 4 a duty forbidden
to Article III courts.1
5
7 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
8 See id. §2.
9 See Craig A. Stern, What's a Constitution Among Friends?-Unbalancing Article III,
146 U. PA. L. REV. 1043, 1060-66 (1998).
10 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
11 See Stern, supra note 9, at 1060-66.
12 See id. at 1052-53.
13 Id. at 1063.
14 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1492, 2509 (2000).
15 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.3, at 48-53 (3d ed. 1999) (discussing
Article III's prohibition against advisory opinions).
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If the paradigm public-rights case to be decided by the Court of Federal
Claims is a claim for money owed by the federal government, what about
related claims for injunctive relief or related claims among private parties? 16
Would deciding such related claims require that the Court of Federal Claims
be an Article III instead of an Article I court? To answer these questions
according to the current doctrine of the United States Supreme Court entails
a two-part inquiry. The Court has opined that the security Article III affords
to judges serves two ends.' 7 First, it secures fairness to litigants because se-
cure judges are less susceptible to improper influence. They may decide ac-
cording to the law, aloof from the temptation to curry favor. According to
the Court, a litigant may waive this protection of fairness. Seeking relief in
the Court of Federal Claims, or perhaps participating in a federal contracting
program, may work such a waiver.'8
The second end of Article III judicial security identified by the Court is
to preserve the structural integrity of the federal courts. Article III estab-
lishes the judicial branch, or the federal courts, as a coequal branch, in part as
a check and balance to the legislative and executive branches. Secure judges
fulfill this role better than dependent judges. Protection of the judicial
branch is not something litigants may waive.' 9 For this end, instead, the
Court has embraced a balancing test, weighing the sacrifice of Article III
protections against the achievement of Article I goals. 20 The more the work
of an Article I court resembles that of an Article III court, the greater the
incursion into Article III protections. The more the rights determined by an
Article I court owe their existence to Congress, the greater the possible ad-
vancement of Article I goals. So, the less an Article I court possesses the
"essential attributes" of an Article III court,21 and the more the matters adju-
dicated resemble matters of public rights, 22 the likelier the Court will hold
that the tribunal need not be an Article III court.
One might think that vesting an Article I court with the power to grant
injunctive relief against the federal government compromises Article III val-
ues and provides an Article I court with an element of the "essential attrib-
utes" of an Article III court. Two aspects of injunctive relief might support
16 Injunctive relief is already available from the Court of Federal Claims. See supra note 6.
On the other hand, the court's lack of jurisdiction over disputes between private parties is a well-
noted absence. See Steven L. Schooner, The Future: Scrutinizing the Empirical Case for the
Court of Federal Claims, 71 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 714, 752 (2003).
17 See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986).
18 The Schor Court held, in part, that a party waived his personal right to having a state
law counterclaim against him heard by an Article III court, instead of by the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission ("CFTC"), by demanding that his opponent proceed against him there in-
stead of in federal court and, apart from this express waiver, simply by seeking relief against his
opponent before the CFTC, knowing that it would exercise jurisdiction over the counterclaim.
Id. at 848-50. Seeking relief in the Court of Federal Claims would seem very much like seeking
relief in the CFTC. But furthermore, the court might find that contracting with the United
States under a regime that adjudicates contract disputes before the Court of Federal Claims
suffices to waive personal Article III protection.
19 Id. at 850-51.
20 See id. at 851.
21 See id.
22 See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 587-90 (1985).
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this view. The first aspect is the nature of injunctive relief. Injunctions, en-
forced by the contempt power, in some ways represent the pinnacle of the
judicial power. Second, the questions of legality, and perhaps even constitu-
tionality, that would serve as the predicate for granting injunctive relief also
may appear to call for an exercise of an "essential attribute" of Article III
judicial authority.
This analysis does not necessarily predict that the Court would hold that
a federal court granting injunctions must be an Article III court. To decide
this issue, the Court balances the compromise of Article III protections
against the benefit that permitting injunctive power brings to Article I goals.
If Article I courts were permitted to decide claims among private parties
in the context of a public-rights claim against the federal government, this
permission would present a question of "essential attributes" in pressing the
limits of the category of "public rights." The Commodity Futures Trading
Commission v. Schor Court adumbrates the approach of the Supreme Court
to this question. In Schor, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
("CFTC") conducted reparation proceedings between private parties to vin-
dicate violations of federal law governing the trading of commodity futures.
23
The proceedings were conducted without the benefit of judges with Article
III security.24 In addition to reparations, counterclaims founded upon state
law also entered into the proceedings.25 The Court rejected an Article III
challenge to the CFTC's authority to decide the state law counterclaims. 26 In
the context of the comprehensive federal regulation of futures trading, the
CFTC decision of such counterclaims made so small an incursion into Article
III protections that, again, balanced against its advancement of Article I
goals, the scheme caused no breach of Article III. Schor may suggest that
lodging third-party jurisdiction with the Court of Federal Claims need not
require transforming the tribunal into an Article III court to pass muster
before the Supreme Court. It may suggest that the Court would hold that the
comprehensive federal regulation of the matters typically brought before the
Court of Federal Claims, along with the benefits of having those matters
comprehensively litigated before such a court, advances Article I goals more
than the litigation of related claims among the private parties before the
Court compromises Article III protections.
In striking its balances, the Court should consult the principles that gave
rise to the public-rights doctrine. 27 The public-rights doctrine originates from
a dispute over a title passed under a distress warrant issued by an official of
the Treasury department to effect the collection of tax from a defaulting tax
collector.28 The Supreme Court held that there was no need under Article
23 Schor, 478 U.S. at 836-38.
24 Id. at 837.
25 Id. at 838.
26 Id. at 847-59.
27 The executive branch must determine public-rights claims. Even apart from the waiver
of sovereign immunity, the government must resolve who owes it what amount in order to make
claims against other entities.
28 Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 274
(1856).
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III or the Due Process Clause for an Article III court to have issued the
warrant. Though Congress could have outlawed such self-help and placed
the issuance of a distress warrant within the exclusive province of an Article
III court, the Constitution did not require it to do so. Like any other party,
the federal government may determine it is owed a debt and may exercise
appropriate self help. Should that debt be brought before a neutral federal
tribunal, then Article III would require the involvement of Article III judges.
The questions regarding the expansion of the jurisdiction of the Court of
Federal Claims implicate claims brought against, not by, the federal govern-
ment. The principles supporting the public-rights doctrine are the same,
however, whether the claims are brought by or against the government.
Once it waives sovereign immunity, a government must determine what
claims it will pay and what claims it will not pay. Like any other debtor, it
must decide when to cut the check. To do so, the government presumably
will act through the executive branch, and charge that branch with paying
debts as prescribed by law. Only when an asserted debt becomes a claim
brought before a neutral tribunal does Article III come into play with its
requirement for judges with Article III security.
Again, the Court of Federal Claims is an Article I court, and, therefore,
its judges lack Article III security.29 Functionally and analytically, it acts for
the executive branch. However unbiased, fair-minded, and independent it is,
the court cannot exercise the "judicial Power of the United States." Instead,
it decides for the government what claims it should pay. For a claim in that
court to become the subject of the "judicial Power of the United States," an
appeal must be lodged with the United States Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit, an Article III tribunal the judges of which do enjoy the protec-
tions assured by that Article. 30 Notwithstanding, the Court of Federal Claims
already has authority to grant injunctive relief.31 And why not? Congress, in
innumerable statutes, has authorized executive officers to decide for or
against government action. If the government must decide what debts to
pay, it surely must decide, more broadly, what it will and will not do. Like
the former decision, the latter does not require an exercise of "the judicial
Power of the United States" but rather an exercise of executive power. Un-
less some other constitutional constraint comes into play,32 nothing prevents
Congress from authorizing an Article I court that determines public-rights
questions to decide claims that the government act in accordance with the
law in ways other than by simply paying its just debts.
The question of third-party claims is more difficult to understand as an
aspect of the traditional public-rights doctrine. It, nevertheless, can be so
understood. To order the payment of any claim brought against the federal
government, the Court of Federal Claims must determine both that the claim
29 See Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 882 (1988).
30 See 28 U.S.C. § 44 (2000).
31 See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 891-901.
32 Cf Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 696-97 (1988) (upholding the Independent Coun-
sel's independence from the President as constitutional); Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295
U.S. 602, 631-32 (1935) (upholding the Federal Trade Commission Commissioner's indepen-
dence from the President as constitutional).
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is sound and that the claim is due to this particular claimant. If certain dis-
putes among nongovernmental parties may be conceptualized as rival claims
to shares of an overall claim made against the government itself, for the court
to decide among these parties how much of the claim is owed to each of them
would appear to fall equally within the public-rights doctrine. Likewise, if a
third party were brought before the court to answer for a claim brought by
the federal government, the public-rights doctrine would support the author-
ity of an Article I court to decide the claims.
The Schor balancing test demands that the Court answer difficult ques-
tions when testing such arrangements as expanding the power of the Court of
Federal Claims. These include questions regarding how much Article I goals
are advanced, how much Article III protections are compromised, and
whether the former measure or the latter carries more weight. 33 Unless the
Court is prepared to question its longstanding precedent based on the public-
rights doctrine, those precedents may be taken for markers of regimes that
do not upset the balance. Similarly, regimes analogous to, or otherwise in
accord with, public-rights doctrine precedents presumably do not upset the
balance. If so, authorizing the Court of Federal Claims to grant further in-
junctive remedies and to determine some third-party disputes does not re-
quire that it be reconstituted as an Article III court.
33 Cf Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment) (commenting on one of the Court's Commerce Clause tests that "[t]his
process is ordinarily called 'balancing,' . . . but the scale analogy is not really appropriate, since
the interests on both sides are incommensurate. It is more like judging whether a particular line
is longer than a particular rock is heavy.").
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